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Abstract 
 
Which is the meaning of constitutional review for a proper assessment of 
subnational constitutionalism? The essay tries to answer this question by means of 
comparative analysis. To do so, it considers both federal systems (the United States and 
Germany) and regional or autonomic systems (Italy and Spain). The analysis of organs and 
procedures allows to draw some conclusions: the presence of a system of constitutional 
review at the subnational level is a crucial element for the development of an autonomous, 
well-grown subnational constitutional law. However, subnational constitutional courts tend 
to have a more complicated relation with legislative and executive bodies, as less guarantees 
of independence or court-overturning amendments show. Finally, subnational 
constitutional courts tend to develop a quite interesting case law, whose experimental 
features sometimes anticipate major judicial trends 
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1. Introductory Remarks  
 
This contribution tries to analyse the role of constitutional review and constitutional 
enforcement within subnational legal orders and their significance to the meaning of 
subnational constitutionalism. In doing so, it will try to look into organs and procedures – 
and, more broadly, systems of constitutional review – in a comparative perspectiveI. 
Why should a comparative analysis of subnational constitutionalism (or 
subconstitutionalism, as it has also been definedII) focus on the role of constitutional courts 
and constitutional review in subnational systems? There are, in my opinion, at least two 
good reasons for choosing such a topic.  
First, the rise of constitutional review – thus meaning enforcement of constitutional 
provisions by the ordinary judiciary or a specialised constitutional court – has been a 
fundamental step in the process of legalisation of the LeviathanIII:  
 
‘This issue of enforcement came to prominence early on in the establishment of modern constitutions. In 
the older meaning of the term, “fundamental law” was understood to be a special type of law that bound 
“morally and politically, not legally” … The concept of fundamental law in modern constitutional regimes is 
associated with the emergence of the institution of judicial review’IV.  
 
A fundamental consequence of such development was the positivisation, de-
politicisation and legalisation of constitutional documents, and ‘the erosion of belief in the 
idea of the Constitution as a type of fundamental law (droit politique) different in kind to that 
of the ordinary law’V. Furthermore, those events also affected the self-understanding of 
constitutional law scholarship as a distinct branch of legal scholarshipVI. To sum up, we 
have to look into the noun: is subnational constitutionalism able to shape, even thanks to the 
operation of constitutional review, some kind of subnational constitutional law? 
Second, we have to consider the adjective: which kind of constitutional review is 
performed at the subnational level of federal or regional polities? According to 
methodological tools drawn from public choice theory, constitutions might be analysed as 
devices to control – and hopefully reduce – agency costs. In their survey of the defining 
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traits of ‘subconstitutionalism’, Ginsburg and Posner hold that a proper assessment of 
subnational constitutionalism has to consider that agency costs are lower within 
subnational polities due to their being part of a broader ‘superstate’: 
 
‘To the extent that agency costs decline when regular states become substates, the value of constitutional 
restrictions (in the substate) also declines. Thus, in the three areas we examine – government structure, 
rights, and amendment – the rules should become weaker, that is, easier to change or in other ways less 
likely to constrain the government. … Because the public and political agents believe that the superstate will 
reduce agency costs, they feel less need to conform to constitutional rules at the substate level’VII.  
 
Ginsburg and Posner’s assumptions mainly concern government, fundamental rights, 
and procedures of constitutional revision. Are they true of constitutional review as well? 
These are the two main research questions which this paper will address in order to 
sketch a profile of subnational constitutional review. The analysis and possible answers will 
be organised around: (1) the existence of a relation between subnational constitutionalism and 
constitutional review; (2) the significance of Ginsburg and Posner’s lower-stakes hypothesis to 
the subject of this paper; and (3) some interesting features of subnational constitutional case 
law. 
 
2. Choosing the Cases: Systems of  Constitutional Review and 
Comparative Analysis 
 
When it comes to pointing out the relevant cases in this area, a preliminary distinction 
has to be drawn. There is a deep link between federal constitutional arrangements and the 
rise of constitutional review. On the one hand, German and Austro-Hungarian 
Staatsgerichtsbarkeit was – alongside the United States (US) model – among the leading 
sources of inspiration for the European model of constitutional reviewVIII. On the other 
hand, it might be worth recalling the High Court of Justice of Sicily (Alta corte di giustizia per 
la Regione siciliana), a peculiar example of ‘arbitral’ constitutional court in Italy (half of its 
members were appointed by the State, the other half by Sicily) which was disbanded after 
the establishment of the (national) Constitutional Court of ItalyIX. For the purposes of this 
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paper, however, I shall only consider organs or procedures aiming at enforcing subnational 
constitutional texts directly at the subnational level. 
A rapid comparative analysis has to consider two variables: the existence of a specialised 
constitutional court as distinct from the ordinary judiciary, and the existence of subnational 
constitutional or ordinary judges. The picture is mixedX. Diffuse constitutional review is the 
typical model in the US, Canada, Australia, or the Latin American FederationsXI. In turn, 
there are specialised constitutional courts in Germany, Austria, Belgium, Italy, and Spain. 
Dual judiciaries are present in the US and Australia. Austria, Belgium, Italy and Spain are all 
marked by federal (or central-state) monopoly over the establishment of courts. The 
position of Canada and Germany is somehow intermediate. On the one hand, in the 
former country there are both federal and provincial courts – but ‘the highest level of 
provincial judiciary is federally appointed and paid’XII. In Germany, on the other hand, the 
only federal courts are the highest appellate courts, while all German Länder have their own 
constitutional courts. The Swiss case is quite similar to the German one, but it has limited 
room for constitutional review, and some Cantons have established their own 
constitutional courtsXIII. A preliminary hypothesis may be laid down: those systems where 
there is room for constitutional review organised at the subnational level are the ones 
where subnational constitutional arrangements have traditionally been thought to be a 
defining feature of their federal model: this is the case of the US or GermanyXIV. If you 
preliminarily take into account the original traits – and the intrinsic limits – of the local 
model of constitutional review, it is the case of the ‘Swiss laboratory’XV of cantonal 
constitutions as well. Conversely, those systems where there are no subnational courts (e.g. 
Austria or Belgium) or the most senior courts are federal (e.g. Canada) have been defined 
by scarce scientific and political consideration of subnational constitutionsXVI. 
The analysis will be organised as follows. It will consider: (1) enforcement of 
subnational constitutional law in a diffuse system of constitutional review (the US); (2) 
some marking aspects of a complete system of subnational constitutional courts 
(Germany); and (3) the problem of constitutional review in ‘autonomic’ legal systems 
where the central state holds a monopoly over it (Italy and Spain). In the end I will try to 
answer the two research questions that I pointed out at the beginning of this paper.  
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3. New Judicial Federalism and Majoritarian Difficulties in the US 
 
As Ginsburg and Posner observed, ‘Americans understand subconstitutionalism as 
federalism’XVII, but ‘the American federalism conceives of two levels of judiciaries and two 
levels of constitutional interpretations that are not always present in Europe’XVIII. 
The US has a dual judicial system, with federal and state courts entrusted, respectively, 
with enforcing federal and state law. The picture, however, is not as plain as this (rather 
simplistic) outlook seems to show. The state courts traditionally had a weak tradition of 
review under state constitutional rights. Besides that, from the 1940s the incorporation of 
the Bill of Rights as part of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
US constitution by the Supreme Court was a fundamental turning point: ‘The presence of a 
federal floor [i.e. those fundamental rights entrenched in the U.S. Constitution] means that 
the stakes are lower with state constitutions than with the Federal Constitution. The federal 
government bears some of the monitoring costs of state governments that would otherwise 
be borne by citizens’XIX. In other words, that circumstance might have meant a massive, 
definitive endpoint of any ‘constitutional’ ambitions of state courts. 
In 1977, however, a well-known article by Justice Brennan pleaded for the contrary, 
symbolically paving the way for the ‘New Judicial Federalism’. The framework of 
Brennan’s insight was the unprecedented expansion of the regulatory scope of federal law 
from the Great Depression to the 1970s, which should not have been thought to relieve 
state courts from their duties of constitutional review, even with regard to those state rights 
otherwise unavailable under the US Constitution: ‘The legal revolution which has brought 
federal law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of 
state law’XX. In fact, that federalising trend also had in itself some signs of its decline, with the 
US Supreme Court eventually ‘adopting the premise that state courts can be trusted to 
safeguard individual rights’XXI. On the one hand, the complex trend known as New Judicial 
Federalism was to be mainly a reaction to the more minimalist approach of the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts towards fundamental rights issues. On the other hand, this trend was 
favoured – and, to a certain extent, made possible – by a doctrine of self-restraint of the 
US Supreme Court itself, which affirmed that it would not have reviewed state court 
decisions resting upon an adequate state groundXXII. 
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That period has been labelled as a ‘golden age’ of state constitutional law and the 
starting point of renewed scientific interest in the topicXXIII. One of the chief assumptions 
of the trend was Justice Brennan’s claim that ‘one of the strengths of our federal system is 
that it provides a double source of protection for the rights of our citizens’XXIV. 
As has been noted, New Judicial Federalism was prompted by the more activist attitude 
of the Warren Court – whilst prior contributions of the state courts to the development of 
the protection of fundamental rights were negligible: ‘state supreme courts did not develop 
a body of civil liberties law prior to the 1930s’. Thus, according to Tarr, the New Judicial 
Federalism ‘represents not a return to the past but ‘an unprecedented exercise of state 
judicial power’XXV. The activism of the Warren Court might not have been so detrimental 
to federalism as its critics pretended: ‘the protection of civil liberties should not be viewed 
as a zero-sum game, in which increased activity by one judiciary necessitates decreased 
activity by the other. Rather, the relationship between federal and state judiciaries involves 
a sharing of responsibility and a process of mutual learning’XXVI. This explanation may be 
interpreted as not perfectly coinciding with Ginsburg and Posner’s outlook; indeed, a 
strengthened constitutional review in the ‘superstate’, as they call it, might be the most 
important factor for a system of state courts to initiate an intensive work of effective 
construction and enforcement of their own constitutional laws. Other commentators, in 
turn, have also tried to argue that the New Judicial Federalism is not really novel but rather 
a ‘rediscovery’ of state constitutions and state declarations of rightsXXVII. 
Even if the actual achievements of New Judicial Federalism are controversial – most of 
all for its actual dimensions and its real influence over the evolution of the US legal system 
as a wholeXXVIII – this trend seems to have been crucial for a radical re-evaluation of state 
constitutional law. 
Some other data, however, impose a more nuanced analysis of those developments in 
the US. These affect, first, the intrinsic characters of state constitutional law as entrenched in 
state constitutions and, second, the position of the judiciary within state political systems and 
political processes. 
Due to reasons concerning state constitutionalism in the US – which have been 
carefully scrutinised by WilliamsXXIX – state rights are usually more weakly entrenched than 
national rights. For the purposes of this paper, this circumstance does entail that 
legislatures and voters within the states are much more willing to reverse decisions by the 
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state courts by means of constitutional revision, modifying of even suppressing provisions 
entrenched in their fundamental charters. Another possible occurrence is the recall of state 
judges, which perfectly fits weaker separation of powers and an inclination towards direct 
democracy or populism, which are also supposed to be typical of state 
constitutionalismXXX.  
Some other data, however, might contradict or, at least, relativise the picture. As I have 
just recalled, ‘in one sense, these court-constraining amendments have been an enduring 
feature of the state constitutional tradition’XXXI, and since the 1970s they have been passed 
most of the time in order to reverse state court decisions concerning civil rights and 
libertiesXXXII. A significant point is that the recent wave of court-constraining – or to be 
more correct, court-overturning amendments – has been severely criticised by scholars, 
who think ‘that they are improper insofar as they take matters that should be resolved by 
the judiciary and place them in the political process’XXXIII. This kind of criticism is 
obviously related to the broader debates on the virtues of political constitutionalism or the 
source of legitimacy of judicial ‘activism’XXXIV; however, it also suggests that a more deeply 
rooted consciousness of the practical relevance of state constitutional law has been 
spreading. 
These final remarks might even suggest that New Judicial Federalism and activism of 
state courts might slowly but inexorably challenge many commonplaces in the perception 
of state constitutional law. Briefly, they might not only have attracted scholarly and public 
attention towards the contents of state constitutions and their own original bills of rights, 
they might also have induced a change in the status of state constitutional law. 
 
4. Constitutional Review in the German Länder 
 
As mentioned before, the German judiciary is traditionally characterised by the presence 
of a number of specialised branches, among which is a court specifically entrusted with 
constitutional review (Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit). Accordingly, fifteen out of sixteen Länder in 
Germany decided to establish a constitutional court of their own. The only exception was 
Schleswig-Holstein which, according to Article 99 of the German Basic Law, handed over 
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to the Federal Constitutional Court the power to decide over ‘its’ constitutional disputes. 
In 2008, however, a Constitutional Court of Schleswig-Holstein was establishedXXXV. 
According to a well-established view, three ‘waves’ of constitution-making are 
recognisable throughout the Länder of the Federal Republic of Germany: the first phase 
lasted from 1945 to 1949, the second phase lasted from 1949 to 1990, and the third and 
current phase started in 1990, with the enactment of the Basic Law and the reunification 
seen as major turning pointsXXXVI. This chronological classification is mainly focused on the 
contents of the constitutions of the Länder, most of all on the provisions concerning 
constitutional principles, fundamental rights, and ‘goals of state action’ (Staatsziele). It is of 
the greatest interest to draw a parallel between that story of constitution-making and the 
establishment of constitutional review in the German Länder from the mid-1940s onwards. 
Seven Landesverfassungsgerichte were established between the end of the Second World War 
and 1949 in Bavaria (1947), Hesse (1947), Bremen (1949), Rhineland-Palatinate (1949), 
Baden, Württemberg-Baden, and Württemberg-Hohenzollern (the three latter Länder were 
later dissolved into Baden-Württemberg). This first phase was quite diverse in cultural 
influences, which came both from the old Germanic traditions of Staatsgerichtsbarkeit and 
Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, and pressures from the Western occupying powers. Constituent 
assemblies in the Länder set out a rich array of procedures of constitutional review, whose 
best examples might be find out in Bavaria. After 1949 – the Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz 
dates back to 1951, and the Federal Constitutional Court started its activity in the same 
year – five other Land constitutional courts were established in North Rhine-Westphalia 
(1952), Hamburg (1954), Baden-Württemberg (1955), Lower Saxony (1955), and Saarland 
(1958). In some cases – for example, Lower Saxony – the Land ordinary law establishing 
the constitutional court just deferred to the correspondent federal law. Most interestingly, 
none of these courts had full competence (if any) over individual complaints 
(Verfassungsbeschwerden). This might look quite striking in those Länder whose constitution 
contains a bill of rights (indeed, it was not [yet] the case of Hamburg and Lower Saxony). 
Seven constitutional courts have been established after the reunification in Berlin (1990), 
Brandenburg (1993), Saxony (1993), Saxony-Anhalt (1993), Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania (1994), Thuringia (1994), and Schleswig-Holstein (2008). The enriched 
competences of those courts – inclusive of individual complaints – seem to show a new 
interest ‘to promote the self-understanding of the Länder over their constitutional law and 
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the consciousness of their statehood by means of autonomous and binding interpretation 
of the Constitution of the Land’XXXVII. 
This chronological insight seems to confirm that constitutional review is a crucial 
element in understanding the significance of a subnational constitutional arrangement. The 
post-1990 phase of constitutional fervour in the Eastern Länder – and, subsequently, in the 
West as well – could not be limited to constitution-making and the updating of the 
fundamental rights entrenched in the Basic Law. Constitutional review was an obvious 
component of that trend. 
Nevertheless, some elements seem to confirm Ginsburg and Posner’s claim on the 
lesser significance of stakes at the subnational level, too. First of all, the length of the term 
of constitutional judges and their possibility of being re-elected should be considered. 
According to comparative scholarship on constitutional review, those members of 
constitutional courts who are elected by legislatures or appointed by executive office-
holders should normally stay in office during good tenure (as happens in the US) or for a 
term whose length largely exceeds the duration of the legislature. Re-election is normally 
excluded in order to avoid possible collusion between the appointees and political office-
holders. In Germany, for instance, the judges of the Federal Constitutional Court, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, are elected for twelve years (unless they attain the mandatory age of 
retirement of sixty-eight before) and cannot be re-elected for another termXXXVIII. A two-
thirds majority of the members of the Bundesrat or the Election Committee of the Bundestag 
is requiredXXXIX. As for personal requirements, appointees have to be eligible to become 
ordinary judges (so-called Befähigung zum Richteramt)XL. A strict regime of incompatibilities is 
laid down by the lawXLI. 
If you consider the situation in the Länder, a trend towards homogeneity – or a 
generalised mechanic transposition of the provisions of the Law establishing the Federal 
Constitutional Court – can hardly be recognised. 
All the elected members of the Constitutional Court of Bremen, some of the members 
of the Constitutional Court of Bavaria and six members of the Constitutional Court of 
Hesse are elected for five years, i.e. the same as the term of the legislature of the LandXLII. 
Judges of the Constitutional Courts of Hamburg, Rhineland-Palatinate, Lower Saxony and 
Saxony-Anhalt are entitled to re-election for another term. Judges of the Constitutional 
Courts of Baden-Württemberg, Saxony, Bavaria, Hessen, North Rhine-Westphalia, 
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Thuringia and Bremen can be re-elected without any time restrictionsXLIII. Re-election, 
instead, is not allowed in Berlin, Brandenburg, and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. A 
plurality of members of the Land legislature is enough to elect constitutional judges in 
Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, and North Rhine-WestphaliaXLIV. 
This circumstance can be duly assessed taking into account that the political systems of 
subnational polities are more likely to be characterised by a dominant party than their 
national counterparts – and many German Länder are not an exceptionXLV. 
Finally, members of constitutional courts in the Länder mostly fulfil their duties on a 
volunteer basis (ehrenamtlich) or as a secondary task (nebenamtlich): thus, when necessary, they 
can be replaced by substitutesXLVI. 
As for procedures, there are both similarities and differences with what the 
Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz prescribes for the Federal Constitutional Court. Perhaps the 
most original procedure to go before a Land constitutional court – and which has no 
equivalent at the federal level – is Bavarian popular action (Popularklage), whereby 
everybody may challenge the constitutional legitimacy of a piece of Land legislation in a 
typically abstract review, without having to prove a violation of his or her fundamental 
rightsXLVII.  
Individual complaints – one of the procedural tools for which the Germanic model of 
constitutional review is best-known – are admitted under different conditions in just ten 
Länder. In many cases, Landesverfassungsgerichte are just entitled to review Land legislative or 
regulatory acts, and not judicial decisions – even in order to avoid conflicts with federal 
appellate courts (e.g. the Federal Court of Justice or the Federal Administrative Court). In 
some Länder, individual complaints can be initiated before their constitutional courts only if 
a parallel individual complaint before the Bundesverfassungsgericht has not been or is not being 
initiatedXLVIII. This is a mostly subsidiary form of constitutional review, which has been 
revitalised since the 1990s even in order to reduce the workload of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, thus setting up the conditions for a ‘doubled protections of 
rights’XLIX. This has been the outcome of a proactive attitude of some 
Landesverfassungsgerichte, a skillful work of dialogue of the Federal Constitutional Court, and a 
passionate debate among constitutional scholarsL. A favourable framework for such 
developments was provided by the ‘third wave’ of constitution-making starting in the 
Eastern Länder in the aftermath of the reunificationLI. 
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The great issue at stake was whether a Land constitutional court could review under the 
provisions of the Land constitution a judicial decision of a Land court in which the latter 
had applied federal legislative law. The first plausible (and positive) answer came from the 
newly established Constitutional Court of Berlin in the so-called Honecker case:  
 
‘the present individual complaint is not less admissible because the challenged judgements have applied 
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Ordnance, i.e. federal law. The crucial point is that those are acts of 
the Land Berlin (Article 49(1) of the Land law on the Constitutional Court). The fundamental rights 
entrenched in the Constitution of Berlin are binding for the judiciary of the Land Berlin (Article 23(1) of 
the Constitution of Berlin) and may be taken into account – compatibly with Articles 142LII and 31 of the 
Basic Law – if it [i.e. the Land courts] applies federal law’LIII. 
 
On the other side, scholars noticed ‘an evident trend’ in the case law of the Federal 
Constitutional Court aiming at strengthening its counterparts in the Länder, in order also to 
reduce its workloadLIV. Dealing with a reference from the Constitutional Court of Saxony, 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht held that the Basic Law does not prevent a Land Constitutional 
Court from reviewing the application of federal procedure law by a court in the Land under 
fundamental rights and right-equivalent guarantees of the Land constitution having the 
same content as the corresponding right in the Basic LawLV. This position of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht implicitly approved the claims which had been made by some – 
although not all – Landesverfassungsgerichte in the preceding years. This has led some 
commentators to claim that ‘to speak today of an exclusive or primary responsibility of the 
Federation for the enforcement of constitutional law appears dubious’LVI. 
Finally, the case law of constitutional courts in the Länder deserves a mention. It has 
mostly been characterised by a significant dialogue – in the broadest, least technical sense – 
among Landesverfassungsgerichte and with the Bundesverfassungsgericht. Two examples are 
sufficient: the legitimacy of the 5%-threshold, which is a landmark in German election 
systems at all institutional levels, has been (successfully challenged) before some 
Landesverfassungsgerichte with regard to its application in municipal electionsLVII – before the 
Federal Constitutional Court decided to declare its constitutional illegitimacy in municipal 
elections or in the election of German Members of the European ParliamentLVIII. Another 
interesting example does concern the recent balanced-budget amendments which cast 
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duties on both the Bund and the Länder: in 2011, the Constitutional Court of North Rhine-
Westphalia recognised the budget of the Land as unconstitutional for violating the new 
rules on public indebtmentLIX. Without trying to draw general conclusions from insulated 
cases, what seems to emerge is that Landesverfassungsgerichte quite often succeed in 
anticipating federal judicial trends. 
 
5. Dilemmas of  the ‘Regional State’ 
 
Traditionally, European constitutional scholarship tends to cast a distinction between 
federal and regional legal systems. Apart from Belgium, those previously unitary states in 
Continental Europe which conferred some degree of institutional and legislative autonomy 
to their territorial units in the 20th century were labelled as ‘regional states’: this is the case 
of the Spanish Third Republic or the Italian RepublicLX. 
Even if the distinction between federalism and regionalism is fading among 
constitutional lawyers and political scientistsLXI, its theoretical foundations are not without 
effect on present-day assumptions concerning many legal aspects of regional autonomy in 
both Italy and SpainLXII. As the Spanish Constitutional Court has recently stated, 
 
‘it is self-evident ... that one of the defining traits of the autonomic State, insofar as it is different from 
the federal State, is that its functional and organic pluralism does not affect the judiciary at all. In the 
autonomic State, the diversification of the legal system, resulting in more autonomous normative systems, 
does not take place at the constitutional level – entailing the existence of more constitutions (federal and 
subnational). Conversely, it only starts at the level of ordinary laws, in presence of one national 
constitution’LXIII.  
 
Thus even if the practical operation of the Spanish federalising process has gone well 
beyond a mere autonomic frame, the traditional scholarly distinction between federal 
systems and autonomous (or regional) ones is still relevant to the self-understanding of the 
system.  
For the purposes of this paper, in particular, it is clear that: (1) (central-state) 
constitutional courts are quite hostile towards any recognition whatsoever of a subnational 
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constitutional lawLXIV; and (2) there can be only one interpreter of the Constitution, i.e. the 
(national) constitutional courtLXV. 
Due to different reasons, both countries have undergone a process of in-depth revision 
of subnational fundamental charters (Statuti of Italian ordinary regions, Estatutos of Spanish 
autonomous communities) in the last decade. After approving new, more ambitious 
regional charters, a concern arose: how to ensure the compatibility of legislative and 
administrative activity of a Region with the provisions of its charter – in other words, how 
to take this piece of fundamental law seriously. In Italy, a law may be declared 
unconstitutional under Article 123 of the Constitution if it violates a regional Statuto. 
Because, among other reasons, of the procedural difficulty of reviewing legislation under 
the provisions entrenched in the regional Statuti, however, the Italian Constitutional Court 
has quite rarely used those provisions to review the legitimacy of (regional) ordinary 
legislationLXVI. 
Furthermore, another major concern is how to build up a ‘culture’ of legislation and 
administration at the subnational level in countries that have traditionally had a very 
centralised organisation. At the national level, this function has traditionally been 
performed by a very prestigious consultative organ, called the Council of State in both 
countries. 
In Spain, for instance, organic law no. 3/1980 on the functions of the Consejo de Estado 
allows it to ‘give advice’ to the autonomous communities as well. Subsequently the Spanish 
Constitutional Court made it clear that autonomous communities are empowered to 
establish consultative bodies of their own, ‘equivalent to the Consejo de Estado’ in 
organisational and functional terms’LXVII. In Italy, the problem might have been even more 
acute because the Consiglio di Stato has traditionally been more interested in developing its 
judicial case law than its consultative functions – being very careful, meanwhile, of 
preventing the rise of decentralised consultative organsLXVIII. 
Both Spanish autonomous communities (since the 1990s) and Italian regions (since the 
2000s) have established consultative bodies entrusted with assessing a priori the 
compatibility of regional legislative and administrative business with, respectively, Estatutos 
or StatutiLXIX. To mention just an example, the Consulta di garanzia statutaria of Emilia-
Romagna is entrusted with: (1) reviewing those events that have provoked a precocious 
dissolution of the legislature; (2) expressing opinions on popular legislative propositions or 
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regional referendums; (3) expressing opinions over the compatibility with the Statuto of 
regional laws and regulations; and (4) solving possible conflicts among regional organs. 
Those organs share some features with both the legislative and the judiciaryLXX. In Italy 
their functions mainly concern the methods of regional legislation and its compliance with 
procedural standards laid down in the regional charters. This appears to be very interesting in 
an age marked by the perception of an irresistible decline of representative legislatures and 
the legislative functionLXXI. They embody a sort of ‘public’ consultative function which 
faces a radical change in legislation: ‘legislative activity has radically changed in the last few 
decades: it has become extraordinarily more complex than has happened before, much 
more limited and constrained’LXXII. Besides this, however, those consultative bodies should 
also play a role of protection of minorities and, most interestingly, of local government 
authorities, which have generally no standing before national constitutional courts. 
Furthermore, they are supposed to act in an institutional framework characterised – as it 
happens in Italy – by the presence of a strong executive and a legislature which is always 
dominated, thanks to the peculiar features of election systems, by the regional president’s 
coalitionLXXIII. This is why structural aspects of consultative bodies are carefully laid down, 
so as to allow political minorities to have a say in the designation of their components. 
A good example of the possibilities and the limitations characterising this trend comes 
from the much-discussed judgement of the Spanish Constitutional Court on the ambitious 
Estatut of the autonomous community of CataloniaLXXIV. In particular, the Estatut changed 
the Consejo Consultivo into a Consell de Garanties Estatutàries (Council for Statutory 
Guarantees), ‘the institution of the Generalitat that ensures that the regulations of the 
Generalitat comply with this Estatut and the Constitution’LXXV. However, in the light of the 
aforementioned considerations on the differences between federations and autonomic 
states, the deliberations of the Consell de Garanties Estatutàries (Council for Statutory 
Guarantees) cannot bind the legislature – the Consell cannot aim at becoming a sort of 
constitutional court of Catalonia: ‘there are substantial and evident conceptual differences 
between the … functions typical of consultative bodies and judicial functions which are 
exclusively exercised by courts, in general, and this Court, in particular, as far as its 
condition of supreme judicial interpreter of the Constitution is concerned’LXXVI. Since the 
Spanish legal system has just one Constitution, there can be only one Constitutional Court. 
Consequently, the Court declared the illegitimacy of a provision of the Estatut according to 
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which ‘the judgments of the Consell de Garanties Estatutàries in relation to Government bills 
and Members’ bills in Parliaments that develop or affect the rights recognized in this 
Estatut, are binding in nature’LXXVII. 
 
6. A Possible Conclusion 
 
In my opinion, the comparative analysis that I have tried to sketch in this paper does 
lend itself to some conclusions which do not necessarily fit into a harmonious and 
coherent picture. Still, they might provide a faithful representation of the ‘spirit’ of 
subnational constitutionalism in the legal systems which I have considered. 
First, there is a persuasive link between lively subnational constitutional arrangements 
and the existence of some form of constitutional review at the subnational level. 
Furthermore, revitalisations of subnational constitutional review tend to attract attention 
towards subnational constitutional law. This is certainly true of the US. The German case, 
in turn, might suggest a slightly different explanation: as seen before, efficiency-driven 
concerns – which an American observer would identify as the defining feature of European 
federalismsLXXVIII – may have had a crucial role in strengthening the role of 
LandesverfassungsgerichteLXXIX. The recent developments in Italian regions and Spanish 
autonomous communities prove how subnational communities are conscious of the 
necessity of having an independent body overseeing the compliance of regional legislative 
and administrative business with their fundamental charters, thus supporting their function 
of fundamental law or, in other words, ‘basic institutional norm’ of a subnational 
polityLXXX. 
Second, constitutional review is a good field to check the sustainability of Ginsburg and 
Posner’s hypothesis. Here again, subnational constitutionalism tends to be understood as 
‘subconstitutionalism’ – that is, a kind of constitutionalism whose operation is largely 
dependent from its inclusion in a larger, comprehensive constitutional order. Thus both 
organisational and functional aspects (see the German case), on the one side, and the 
position of constitutional review within the broader subnational polity (think of court-
constraining amendments in the US), on the other, show that constitutional law – as a kind 
of fundamental law – tends to be taken less seriously at the subnational level. Indeed, the 
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position of constitutional courts – or ordinary courts entrusted with constitutional review – 
within subnational institutional systems is often dependent on how the national 
constitutional court decides to interpret their mutual relations and their respective roles in 
the enforcement of constitutional law (see the attitudes of the US Supreme Court and the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht in sections 3 and 4). 
Third, lower constitutional stakes – whose existence cannot be denied – are also an 
incentive to make experimentations. Constitutional review probably offers a good example 
of subnational constitutional arrangements as a specification of the view of federalism as an 
organisational form which allows and actually (hopefully) encourages institutional 
experimentation. The most famous exposition of this view is Justice Louis D. Brandeis’ 
dissenting opinion in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann: ‘It is one of the happy incidents of the 
federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country’LXXXI. This conception is deeply rooted in the American understanding of state 
constitutionalism as an intrinsic element of federalism, as the Supreme Court more clearly 
argued in the Lopez case: ‘In this circumstance, the theory and utility of our federalism are 
revealed, for the States may perform their role of laboratories for experimentation to devise 
various solutions’LXXXII.  
I will just recall three examples: as different as they are, they offer a convincing 
demonstration of this assumption and possibly allow provision of an even more nuanced 
conclusive picture. The first one is New Judicial Federalism in the US: as said before, some 
commentators have seen the rise of enforcement of state fundamental rights by state courts 
as a development prompted by the activist attitude of the Warren Court until the late 
1960s; this, however, might also suggest that a stronger role of constitutional review at the 
federal level (i.e. in the ‘superstate’) does not necessarily entail a more relaxed attitude on 
the side of state courts. The second example is popular action in the Freistaat Bavaria: the 
introduction of a procedural tool which is quite rare in most legal systems has allowed the 
Constitutional Court of Bavaria to elaborate the richest and most significant case law 
among the German Land constitutional courts. 
Third, I think it is important to point out again the possibility of regional consultative 
bodies of reviewing regional legislative procedures in Italy, where the national 
Constitutional Court has consistently held that the internal proceedings of the Parliament 
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are more often outside the scope of its reviewing activityLXXXIII. In my opinion, this trend 
might be properly evaluated if a comparison is made with the willingness of German Land 
constitutional courts to review budgetary legislation under the provisions of the 
Finanzverfassung after the ‘Second Reform of Federalism’ in 2009, as has happened in North 
Rhine-Westphalia. These are meaningful innovations because of the traditional deference 
of the courts towards political office-holders in what has long been seen as the most vital 
core of representative democracy – financial decision-making. As has been held, those changes 
have been possible at the subnational level ‘because it may be less tightly committed to the 
rhetoric of sovereignty’LXXXIV. 
These are all important demonstrations of how the subnational constitutional space may 
act as a laboratory not only with regard to higher levels of protection of fundamental rights 
but also to a more transparent and participative political process. If this assumption is 
correct – as I think it is –well-known narratives of subnational constitutional systems being 
pervaded by majoritarian traits and lesser guarantees for political minorities could be 
partially reconsidered. In other words, ‘lower stakes’ may also mean lesser deference 
towards the most jealously preserved domaines réservés of the legislative and the executive. 
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